Seeing is Believing Part 2 – On Plausibility

“Seeing is believing” – or is it?

Remember from Part 1, published a month ago, that my venerable Aunt Ethel claimed, “On my birthday I saw Humpty-Dumpty take a big fall.”

She is not blind, rarely wears glasses, hears quite well, so what did she see? Since none of the witness believe that a person or object corresponding to the description of Humpty-Dumpty exists in the sense that it can be seen wandering around the neighbourhood in the ”real” palpable world, Aunt Ethel’s perception may have played her a trick.

The obvious solution is that she mistook a rather small, round, egg-shaped, bald gentleman ambling around the cricket field as Humpty-Dumpty. Such mis-identifications are common enough. Or perhaps she omitted a word or two and wanted to say, “I saw someone who reminded me of…”

She surely did not mean that there is more than one Humpty-Dumpty since the name is not a tag for a class which has more than one member, but refers to a class which has a defining set of properties which limits it to one member only.

Therefore it is unlike Tweedledum and Tweedledee, which is a class specifically limited to two members. However, the class is defined in a manner which precludes their instantiation. In common parlance, they are fictional characters which have many attributes — in fact, more attributes than may be found in some catalog of attributes but which include that these do not have life-signs, like “amble about of their own free will!” Such attributes specifically preclude that they could be encountered on the street, on a boat, or in an airplane — that is, in living form. We often describe something by stating explicitly what properties it does not have, e.g., an instance of vandalism as being, in part, thoughtless acts, compared to those which were instances of willful destruction.

The general principle is this: There are words and expressions which we use to report to others:

  1. that we have made an encounter of some kind
  2. that what was encountered can be described to others so that others can identify the object of our encounter on the basis of some limited selection of items which we have selected from a larger set than was provided, and
  3. that the identification of the object of the encounter can be facilitated by assigning to it a tag (perhaps a name, like Humpty-Dumpty) by which it then becomes more widely known.

The tag that refers to a class of one only (like Emperor Napoleon I or Emperor Napoleon III or Picasso’s portrait of Gertrude Stein) is all that is needed to enable others to identify the object of my encounter. But what is involved is that the report of my encounter involves a hypothesis to the effect that the encounter has been coded by myself in the hope that it can be readily decoded by others without them making a critical error, a fatal mistake in identification. Since coding means that only some of the attributes of an encounter are contained in the message, the probability of an error in recognition by others is relatively high.

To illustrate this, consider the case where the Mafia boss says “get me Joe Bloomfield” and his henchmen shoot down the hamburger vendor on 10th Street, not the barber on 42nd at Times Square. What the two men have in common is a name, their location in New York City and some other qualities, e.g. gender. So the name served to locate the object or, in this unfortunate case, the target, but the name did not inform whether sufficient attributes were listed to sort it from a mass of other potential targets.

The key issue for discussion is to sort out claims made by others — whether it is the claim made by my Aunt Ethel or by a witness in a court of law — about the relation between what they claim to have witnessed and the plausibility of their testimony. In the case of Aunt Ethel the plausibility of her claim is zero because she failed to acknowledge that she was a witness to “a likeness of” and not a witness to an “encounter with the one and only fictional character described by Lewis Carroll named Humpty-Dumpty.” It is a common enough error made in reporting, but in this case it stands out because the claim is utterly implausible and by inference, also improbable. Aunt Ethel could not have seen what she claimed to have witnessed on the ground of implausibility.

Seeing is Believing — Or Is It?

You don’t see a Belief, but believe what you see — but should you?

“Seeing is believing” — or is it?

“You see one — of many?”

“On my birthday I saw Humpty-Dumpty take a big fall,” says Aunt Ethel, who turned 102 yesterday.

What did she see?

She is not blind, rarely wears glasses, hears quite well. She is acute and astute. We assume that she must have seen something, but did she see what she reported? Since none of her interlocutors believe that a person or object corresponding to the description of Humpty-Dumpty exists in the “real”, palpable world — except in a much-loved story — Aunt Ethel’s perception played her a trick. Or so we conclude.

But if we are wrong, and Aunt Ethel’s sighting can be confirmed, would she be entitled to claim, “I saw a Humpty-Dumpty. Furthermore, there are more Humpty-Dumptys somewhere, in fact, I saw only one of many.”

We are all Aunt Ethels in this respect because we all tend to assume on the basis of one sighting that there are more of the same, unless the sighting has a particularizing, individuating name, or tag. The logic runs: “a class of one is still a class” — call it a sample of a class.

I saw a black swan 10 days ago — ergo, there are black swans, or black swans exist. Not only one, but some (many).

To say “I saw the only black swan 10 days ago” is a very strong hypothesis which runs as follows: “Normally there are no black swans, but I saw one and since I believe what I see, therefore I also believe that black swans exist, but perhaps only one!”

What I have done is to clarify what is meant by holding a belief – by assuming that something which is against the grain can nevertheless be incorporated with a set of expectations which I have come to share – or have unconsciously learned to share — with others.

My Aunt Ethel simply followed a widely-adopted convention when she suggested that seeing a one of something is an acceptable basis for assuming that uniqueness is not “normal” at all, but that a single case is a good and fair ground for assuming that there are more of the same somewhere, some place. Keep counting.

Aperçu: On Clarification and Definition

A definition assigns a distinct, preferably unique meaning to a word. It is a legislative act whose purpose is to limit the use of a word, to restrict its range, and to decide — once and for all — how it is to be used in all conceivable contexts. It involves taking the analogy out of language!

This brazen objective is rarely realised by the definer — and when successful, it is usually not for long because, words have a way of shedding their tethers. The best examples of this are found in advanced natural sciences, where each discovery is named, baptized. What is a hadron? It is not for eating yet, but tomorrow some enterprising entrepreneur may come up with a product, name it “hadron” and flood the marketplace with this delectable mushy chocolate-tasting, non-fattening, gluten-free imitation chewing gum!

Clarification, however, is entirely different from definition. One selects a concept and its term(s) that already exist, which may in fact be quite widely used — as hadron is in particle physics — and may have a history of use in a variety of contexts. One then shows in what manner the concept has been employed, what alternate terms are already in use for it (for it is not unique) and in what manner the term can be extended from its literal to many new figurative meanings. One also tries to point out what implication the term may have, or may have acquired over its long period of use. The term has a history — which may help contribute to its interest. Thus, in clarification one performs an analysis not a dissection of the term, and one should not be over eager to give a term which may already be rich in meaning, a singular unique meaning, except for the nonce.

It seems to me that philosophers are in the business of clarification — at least some are. Clarification may bring enlightenment, broaden the understanding of a concept whereas clarification may help to throw it into stark contrast to other ideas, to which it is related. One benefit is that it may add wisdom, a quality many of us seek but few attain. Wisdom is not discovered like a pebble on the sands, but is the outcome of an inquiring mind that seeks a better understanding of how different aspects of their experience can be interconnected to yield a special perspective on the world, a perspective which the person may then share with others.

In summary: Definitions deliberately restrict and often do so for justifiable reasons, whereas clarifications expand our horizons and promote our understanding of individual experiences and our shared world. One can do both, yet recognize that each has its separate place in the order of things.

Are There Infallible Facts?

“I suppose you could say that, if a fact isn’t infallibly true, it was never a ‘fact’ in the first place! ”comment on previous entry.

Steven Vasta’s comment on my recent blog on Facts — where I argued that facts are claims to truth but that such claims are not necessarily true for all time (as has often been argued) — needs an answer. The idea that something is infallibly true, and that this defined the notion of “fact,” is highly contentious. I don’t know that anyone has actually made this claim. What they have said is that when someone says “This statement describes a fact and you need to accept this judgement because of the authority of the person making the claim,” they are not arguing for the truth of what has been claimed , but for the authority of the person who is making the claim. It is a person who is said to be infallible – not what the person says. In other words, the notion of an “infallible fact” has not been put forward.

Of course I did not use the qualifier fallible or infallible when describing facts, but have written in my blog – and elsewhere – that the claim concerns whether a fact has everlasting life, as has often been supposed. Its duration – its survival – may indeed be influenced by its supporters – but in the long run the life of a fact is limited.

Here are two cases of “factual” claims:

(a) The camel sails across the desert
(b) Muhammad was a camel driver

(a) is surely not literally true: boats sail – not camels. Camels may look like sail-boats from the distance, to an imaginative observer! If one changes the verb from “sails” to “walks”, no one will object, since most people will describe camels as walking or trotting across the desert. Not infallible and not fallible.

(b) is a different description. It refer to a particular individual, identifies him only by one of his names and claims what his occupation was. It could be true, but it could also be false. Investigations will show whether the statement is true, partly true, adequate, or insufficient – there are several options open to us.

Note: It is not the statement that is fallible or infallible, but the person who makes the statement. I personally do not know of anyone who is a specialist in infallible statements – although I know many who ACT AS IF they were. It is a self-description, an affectation at worst. Some people, in moments of hero-worship, may claim that Mr. X or Miss Y is always correct in what they say or claim. But this only passes the buck. The person making such a claim is obliged to demonstrate that the claim itself is always true – that indeed it is they that are infallible in their judgements. It has nothing to do with any particular fact and its truth-value.

Many religious and political groups claim that their leader has a special handle on Truth. These claims cannot be supported to everyone’s satisfaction – which makes the claims open-ended and not final. It is therefore perfectly possible within the bounds of reason that something which has been widely accepted as truthful in the past, for many years and even for centuries, as giving an adequate account of something that has happened, or may yet happen, may turn out to fall woefully short, of missing the mark and of being false. Prophets fall into this class of people.

It is people that are fallible. Their reports and statements about the world as they experience it are as likely to be incorrect, incompatible with other things we know and which we firmly believe to be true. But moments pass — the fact — no matter how fervently it is proclaimed, is then defrocked; facts pass into history.

Aperçu: The limits of facts

fact-stampFacts should carry date-marks so that we can know when and by whom these were approved. This practice — if religiously observed — would remind us again and again that facts are not infallible, not forever, not unchangeable, but bear the stamp of human approval and not divinity. Furthermore facts are subject to change, can become factoids.

Yet be aware of changes and always question why these are proposed, for these may be part of an effort to undermine our confidence in what we do and deprive us of the authority to view matters critically, with fresh eyes and critically.

My Wife’s Logic

Closet door 02In my wildest fantasy I own a house with an infinitely large room which I use for storage. I store every moment of my experience, and have available to me a device with which I can instantly retrieve all stored items.

My wildest fantasy is my wife’s nightmare. “Who will clean the room, keep it organized, keep some free space in your room?”

I will – with my magical device which passes all understanding!

She replies, “But without understanding, all will be chaos, as now, as before, and therefore also in future.”

Why are wives so full of the right logic? Such inverterate spoilers of wild fantasies?

Past, Present and Future — A Problem of Demarcation?

If the past is unknowable, so is the present and so must be the future — including our future.

Every present becomes the past — in an instant. William James talks about a specious present, an awareness which varies but is never very long. So the past can only be known as an edited version of the present. It cannot be complete. Our records of the past are either documented or preserved in personal memory. Neither can be complete.

Therefore any claim to know the past except as a reconstructed conjecture fails to meet our highest standards of accuracy and our most desired expectations. To be truthful about the past is, at best, a noble attempt to reconstruct the present from past clippings. At worst it is self-delusion which may also delude others unintentionally: it surely has such an effect.

Aperçu #2: Dedication

Sometime a few words are enough. My wife and I were thinking — as grandparents often do — about what lies ahead for our grandchildren, and we concluded that they each show a characteristic which has more to do with parenting than with their genes, and more to do with style than content. It is their dedication to tasks, not how they do these, not the nature of the tasks whether given or self-initiated, but in how these are pursued. Each child has their own individual style, but they have in common an ambiance, an absorption, a willingness to see it through, and a pride in doing things for reasons which we, as adults, can only presume. Whether one is creating a Lego model, practicing the piano, or reading a story book slowly and with stammers, it matters not: what matters is the devotion and the dedication given to each task.

Bright are many,
Dedicated few.
— Hilde Thornton

Brightness is nature-given,
Dedication mostly learned.
— Harry Hurwitz

When partners complement each other to provide harmony and co-operation within a learning environment, their children thrive.
— Harry Hurwitz

Aperçu

Like most words the French aperçu has more than one meaning. It can mean a glance, a glimpse, an insight or a hint, a sketch or outline, a summary and even a preview. I would like to use the word here and in future notes in the sense of a short statement which may contain some insight, some wit, some twist or thought, perhaps even as an introduction to a more eloquent statement to be published some time in the future.

So let us begin. Each aperçu will be numbered and labeled. I hope that will help.

Aperçu #1 : Interpreting another’s meaning

As a philosopher you must believe that what another philosopher said is what you understand him to have meant! There is no other way of doing philosophy, for if you deny this premise you could not give an exposition of another’s viewpoint, only your own. You could then end in an infinite regress, asking again and again whether what philosopher A  said is what he had meant to say.

Now you could be incorrect in your understanding of philosopher A, of what philosopher A meant. But how could you discover this error in your judgment? How could you find out?