A Theory for Adam and Eve

A theory has content and form. The content of a theory is what a theory is about, as expressed in the declaration “every theory is an attempt to account for something that is said to exist”, or “a theory accounts for the action of something that is said to exist’. Thus a theory takes some generally accepted phenomenon, or phenomena, and attempts to demonstrate how these — what is said to be the case, the description of the phenomenon/phenomena or state of affairs — are determined by other factors.

Of course, the concept of “determined” is itself problematic, but covers issues which cannot be dealt with in this short note. I therefore propose to limit myself by looking at only one example of an observation for which an explanation has always been asked for, by the people in the rain-forests of the Amazon basin and those that live in the coldest north: the phenomenon of the stars in their firmament.

No one accepts that these points of light are just there, pasted onto a blackened sheet of papyrus! I suspect even Adam and Eve had questions about this awesome phenomenon, and since they had no knowledge about most things or so we have been told, their questions were presumably naïve and the answers which would satisfy them would also be naïve! Yet it would be reasonable to assume that answers could be framed specifically for them by using terms which stand a little above and beyond their naiveté!

In other words, we assume that any attempt to explain something involves a reference to other cases than those included in the original question. The effort must be directed to show that current question require an answer which refers to explanations that have been accepted for similar cases and which are, by all accounts, reasonably authenticated. This is not a circular argument, but a spiral one: one moves away from the familiar into a more abstract realm.

But what is missing from a circular account is that any explanation – no matter how naïve — refers to things which are beyond our current ken, and includes imaginary agents, events and forces. We have to assume that even Adam and Eve had this capacity to imagine the impalpable otherwise they could not have been seduced in the first place! Adam and Eve had to be able to imagine a superior world to the one they inhabited. “Oh brave new world that hath such creatures in it” (Shakespeare: The Tempest, Miranda, Act 5., Sc 2.)

Conclusion: Humans – in general – have an attribute (which is itself inferred) that allows them to envision, name and concretize matters or events beyond their individual sensory inputs and beyond what they already know.

In modern terms, through a bewildering variety of technical devices, we exotic creatures transform our perceptions in a more extravagant manner than any other living thing known to us. We then manufacture images, compositions, models, and other responses with an often unrecognizable assortments of characteristics. Furthermore we have, so far, failed to construct a reliable working model of our own activities that can accurately predict what we do, when and how we do these things and, above all, why.

Philosophy is not Science

Philosophy is not Science. Most philosophers are not scientists by inclination or training. Some may have studied science subjects at school or university; others may have backgrounds in the liberal arts or mathematics, or they may have just drifted into philosophical studies and later became totally absorbed in it. It was not always thus. In earlier times there were those who called themselves natural-philosophers because their primary interest was in the study of natural phenomena: physics, chemistry, botany, anatomy, whereas others were content to be grouped with theologians, or with students of language, the law, the classics or were clerks or politicians in their daily life.

If Philosophy claims the same status as a Science, it is bad philosophy. It then confuses the diner with the dinner. To stretch this analogy: one may select a menu fix but one does not eat the menu, only the dishes described on the menu.

Philosophers change the world when they prescribe how we should describe it. Thus, they both prescribe and proscribe – habits learned during the long period when philosophers served at the court of princes and popes. They in effect then say to us that we – the non-philosophers – have described the world incorrectly so far and that we should re-describe it according to principles that they have laid out for us. This wanton act authorizes and legitimatizes certain methods, i.e. preferred ways and means of conceptualizing our world. We are being told, often very politely, that we have so far incorrectly described our experiences, and that our descriptions may be replete with unwarranted assumptions. If this is true, who do we blame, but our previous teachers?

Fortunately philosophers tend to disagree more among each other than with those of us on the outside: this saves us all from inevitable perdition.

Guernica or the Horrors of War – 2013 version

Last night one of the news channels on TV showed a scene of six little boys, from 3 to about 12 year old sitting in a dark, filthy cave, facing the opening of the cave to a bitter cold outside, looking hungry, tearful – waiting for their mother. We were told that she had gone out much earlier looking for food and water. The scene was Syria.

We do not know whether the mother returned, but hoped that she did and carried some food with her, enough for another day. The father had been killed earlier.

We have heart, soul, empathy, humanity and we cry for justice as we have for the past thousands of years.

Frankly it doesn’t matter where the scene was filmed, who the children were, what religious or political convictions their parents subscribed to. It was the face of humanity we confronted in powerless silence.

Fractionation: A Late Reply

The following is a reply to Sean’s comment on “Fractionation and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge”, posted March 2011.

zooming2Two years is a long time to get an answer to one’s mail but it often takes even longer to think through the implication of a counter-proposal or expansion to one’s ideas. That said, let me answer Sean (March 29, 2011) who suggested that one could view the divisions within science that take place over time, and with increasing frequency as well severity, a case of zooming. *Zooming* is not a common term applied to the expansion of disciplines, but is itself a neologism. It means that when all our knowledge is taken as a whole it is possible to focus on a section of it, zooming on a speck of this to the exclusion of all else. The effect is to give this section clarity whereas other matters become in-articulated, nebulous, even frozen for the time being.

Now if this is the case – and we must keep in mind that we are speaking in analogies – the greater clarity of the focal area, on which we have zoomed, will be at the cost of increasing opaqueness of all neglected areas, those which lie outside the focus. From my viewpoint this has the net effect of creating a chasm between the focus of the zoom and matters lying on its periphery, that is, out of focus. As Sean states it so well and succinctly “the details of any specific discipline (lying out of focus).. .. are no longer accessible”.

This situation would create an enduring tension between different disciplines. If, for example, discipline A – the focus of our attention – relies on pressupositons borrowed from discipline B, changes in B would undermine some of the positions taken within discipline A.

I think this is what happens. At the present time the new discipline of neuro-psychology – call it discipline C – depends heavily of two areas of psychology and at least two in neuro-physiology. The areas of psychology are studies of cognition and studies of learning. Each of these are themselves fractionated, have their own theories, their own data and often are in stark conflict with each other. This state of affairs make discipline C much less firm than one would wish it to be, and the theories emerging within C, he field of neuropsychology, will be less staunch than is claimed.

So zooming creates problems for those who hold that scientific knowledge integrates and will ultimately achieve the end-result wished for by earlier advocates of the “unity of science”. The growth of knowledge therefore refers literarily to the increased understanding of smaller segments of our knowledge without guaranteeing that these can be completely integrated in manner which will yield a comprehensive “picture” of our universe.

The universe is an idealized picture of what could be – but isn’t.

Humans as Bats: Induced enhancement of sensory capacities — fact or fiction?

More than 50 years ago Tomas Nagel 1 challenged us in a philosophical paper to think about “what is it like to be bat”. The paper had an enormous impact and is frequently cited and reprinted. An answer to some of his questions may be in the works!

Science recently published a joint report from the Laboratory of Neurogenetics and Behavior, University of Mississippi, the Department of Artificial Intelligence, Massachusetts Institute of Technology , and the Darwin Laboratories, University of Cambridge (UK), about a series of discoveries made over the last 19 years. The report is dated 15th January 2049 and covers research completed under joint grants of NASA, The Institute of Public Health, the Rockefeller Foundation, The Templeton Foundation and the Medical Research Foundation, UK on new genetic modifications of Humans in an effort to enhance and extend their sensory capacities.

Briefly, the research followed a suggestion by Professor Joshua Zangmeyer of Cambridge, head of the Gregory Research Laboratories, that it may be possible to genetically engineer a human embryo so as to add sensory capacities which would enhance its visual and auditory sensory range and competencies throughout life. The idea was to develop two separate mechanisms: the first, a neural switching element which would increase sensitivity to infrared radiation, during periods of low illumination, specifically during dusk and night periods, and concurrently reduce sensitivity to strong illumination. One proposal investigated was whether in addition to rods and cones new neural receptors could be developed well as a central selector device or processor which would “read” illuminations in the environment before switching from one set to another.

During daytime conditions the individual would be tuned as now, whereas during dusk-to-dawn periods the individual’s sensitivity to illumination and hue conditions would be decreased. The current proposal is that during “night time” conditions the perception of color is relatively unimportant and could be sacrificed.

Sensory adjustments to sound are also being explored. One proposal is to develop echo-location mechanisms which become operative during dusk-to-dawn period so that humans would be programmed like bats. Dr. Umberto Gabrielli of the Baroque Hearing Labs at the University of Padova is exploring the possibility of developing ear-posturing central mechanisms which would facilitate humans to automatically cup ears to monitor sound sources during low illumination periods. The idea came to Dr Gabrielli watching his grandparents as they were chatting with their hearing-impaired fellow residents in the local infirmary in Padua.The research is at an advanced stage.

There are now five exemplars of humans who have undergone these genetic transformations; two young men and three young women. Outward appearances belie the genetic transformations achieved! As explained in Professor Zangmeyer’s brief report, the five subjects of these experiments – whose names are being withheld – are leading normal lives despite their superior sensory equipment.

The laboratories are currently testing five subjects by extensively mapping brain-activity following a suggestion that presently under-used areas of the sensory areas of the brain could become empowered to achieve these sensory enhancements. Also, a group of Cambridge and IT philosophers are currently studying the effects of sensory enhancements on the development of language and on what is known as the emergence of “epistemological lexicons “ that is, on how these new versions of “Homo Sapiens” will modify their language to reflect the fact that they have developed additional sensory inputs with which to construct their knowledge of the external world (see B. Russell2)

These “new” artificially produced members of Homo Sapiens have been given the sub-species name of Homo Seymor, or simply Seymors, in honor of an early pioneer (c.1948) of the long term effects of sensory deprivation.

(1) Thomas Nagel: “What is it like to be a Bat,” Philosophical Review (1974). See also Block Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, 1980. Cambridge.
(2) Bertrand Russell: Our Knowledge of the External World(1914), Routledge Classics, 2012.

Fractionation and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge

During the past 75 years departments in major universities have increasingly divided or split into separate units, a phenomenon I term “fractionation”. Fractionation is not confined to the “mature” disciplines in the natural sciences, Physics, Chemistry, or Biology, but seems to apply generally.

There is some informal preliminary evidence that before a new discipline joins the community of sciences as an independent unit – a process which may take many years – it may already possess a solid theory and may even have impressive supporting data for it. The major attribute of such a new discipline would be its power to stimulate intensive research and its ability to gather much additional “confirming” data (i.e. knowledge).

This brief sketch of how contemporary science may be producing new knowledge disagrees in many respects with those accounts which are primarily based on case histories from the period from Copernicus to Einstein. But science in all its forms has become heavily institutionalized during the past century and it is entirely possible that this has also changed the character of science and how science is done.

Under what historical conditions has this happened? How does the process of fractionation affect the emergence of new theories and consequently the production of data? Does it change the dynamics of the growth of scientific knowledge? By pooling resources from sociology, history and the philosophy of science, I hope to explore and attempt to answer these open questions.